

Formal verification of nonlinear hybrid systems using ARIADNE

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
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Why consider systems as hybrid?


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
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In general, for our *formal* results we want to be as faithful to the real system as possible



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Re can be approximated, but not in *both* an effective and efficient way.

- Some operations on accurate representations are still undecidable.
- Coarse approximations are problematic in terms of reliability of results.



Possible choices of approximating Re :


1. **Inner approximation** I : Re strictly contains I .
2. **Outer approximation** O : Re is strictly contained in O (an over-approximation of Re).
3. **ε -lower approximation** L_ε : every point of L_ε is at a distance less than ε from Re (an over-approximation of a subset of Re).



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- Inner approximation is not computable in general.
- Outer and ε -lower approximations can be used to verify/falsify properties.



- Re is the reachable set, which is unobservable.
- S_1, S_2 are sets satisfying given properties.
- O is the outer approximation of Re .
- L_ϵ is the ϵ -lower approximation of Re .



- Developed by a joint team including the University of Verona, the University of Maastricht, the University of Padova, and the University of Barry (Florida)
- Uses the formalism of **hybrid automata** to describe **nonlinear time-continuous** systems.
- Based on rigorous semantics paired with **interval arithmetics** to guarantee correctness of verification over **approximated sets**.
- Written as a C++ library, released as an open source distribution: <http://www.ariadne-cps.org>



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Lower semantics

When numerical inaccuracies make the transition undecidable, evolution stops. Computed sets must include at least one point of Re .



ARIADNE can compute the following approximations of the reachable set (available semantics under parentheses):

- An over-approximated subset, up to a given time t : for proving/disproving properties where a bound on the evolution time is identified [upper, lower];
- An **outer approximation** : for proving properties using infinite-time evolution [upper];
- For a given $\varepsilon > 0$, an **ε -lower approximation** : for disproving properties using infinite-time evolution [lower].



Safety

Verify whether a system satisfies some given safety properties.

Dominance

Given two controllers, verify which one has the largest safety margin for given closed-loop requirements.




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
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Both these verifications can be performed parametrically by analyzing **intervals** of constants and splitting the resulting parameters space.



- Very strict safety requirements.
- Increasing reliance on assisted control for improved accuracy.
- Traditionally focused on control theory specifications, recently adopting formal verification approaches.





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Allow to model noisy inputs, thus expanding the validity of verification results. Also required to model **unspecified inputs**, enabling the verification of subsystems in partial isolation



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Expand the verification/automation routines

For example:

- controller synthesis starting from desired properties
- contract-based design for modular systems