


Transparent Fault Tolerance Support in Model-Based Design

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2nd Italian Workshop on Embedded Systems (IWES)
September 7 – 8, 2017, Rome, Italy



Outline

- Overview and Motivation
- Fault Tolerance Framework
- Fault Injection Capabilities
- Conclusion

The CPAL Language

Cyber Physical Action Language

A high-level DSL to model, simulate, verify, and implement CPSs

- It can express both functional and **non-functional** behaviors
- It can be **executed** in real time on an embedded platform, by means of an interpreter
- Simulation and execution are **timing equivalent**
- The language natively supports multiple periodic and/or event-driven **processes**, each modeled by means of a Mealy Finite State Machine (FSM)

The CPAL Language

Sample Process

```

processdef P(params) {
  common {
    code
  }

  state Warning {
    code
  }
  on (cond) {code} to Alarm_Mode;
  after (time) if (cond) to Normal_Mode;


  finally {
    code
  }
}

process P: inst[period,offset][cond](args);

@cpal:time:inst{
  annotation code
}

```

Elementary execution step



Using CPAL

A “Real-World” Modeling Language

- **C-like** syntax
- Suitable as an **implementation** language
- Schedulability analysis and timing-accurate simulation
- Run-time **introspection** (e.g. for overload detection)

Goals

- Use CPAL to model a communication protocol for fault tolerance (interactive consistency)
- Compare it with another prominent language (Promela)

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CPAL vs. Promela — Main Remarks

- Promela is meant for **verification**, rather than execution
 - Non-determinism is at the core of the language
 - No I/O support
 - No floating point data types
 - It can be translated to C and Java (with varying success)
- CPAL supports timing-accurate **simulation** and interpreted **execution**
 - Non-determinism must be avoided in most real systems
 - No formal proofs (except for schedulability analysis)
 - Executable model
 - The execution platform is decoupled from the application

Fault-Tolerant CPSs

As CPSs become more and more software intensive, **software defects** tend to become the major source of faults

- Fault **tolerance** enables a system to tolerate software faults after its development
- Few work is done on automatic fault tolerance analysis and implementation at the system **design** phase

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- Improve system **dependability** ...
- ... without affecting its **functional** behavior and **timings**
- Full **integration** with MBD workflow

Fault-Tolerant CPSs


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Model-Based FT System Design/Development



N-Version Programming (NVP)

N-fold replication of the same computation, carried out by means of N software modules, called **member versions** (software diversity)


- Member versions run in parallel, operating on the same inputs
- Result reached by consensus (e.g. majority voting)
- Requires member versions to generate **comparison vectors** at predefined **cross-check points**
- Feedback to the member versions depending on the result (terminate/continue, recovery)

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NVP Framework



Based on **software patterns**,
 automatic **code-generation friendly**,
 cross-check points set at **execution step** boundaries

Main Achievements

- Fault-tolerant mechanisms are kept independent from the logic of the application
- System designers may explore their use early in the design phase, focusing only on the application-dependent functional logic
- Minimal or no user involvement in low-level implementation details
- A C-language implementation derived from the model is also available (when direct model execution is impractical)

The same methodology can be applied to **other** fault tolerant mechanisms

Software Fault Injection

Motivation

No fault tolerance framework can be considered complete without the ability of **injecting** faults into the model

- Very powerful, well-understood **assessment** technique
- Time consuming, requires extensive know-how

Goals

- Automate software fault injection
- Integrate it with the design flow . . .
- . . . by means of **software patterns**

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What Can We Model? — Fault Categories

- **Global State:** State information resides in a pool of RAM statically allocated at link time → Its corruption can model various kinds of memory corruption
- **Activation Arguments:** Processes access state information through arguments, passed by value or by reference → Better granularity (down to the process activation level)
- **Instance Variables:** Local (stack-based) process storage is often implemented differently than global storage → Support the distinction between how different kinds of memory fail
- **Control Flow Disruption:** Most details of control flow are hidden in the model → Tampering with state transition conditions provides a useful surrogate

How? — Injection Mechanisms and Patterns

- **External Injector:** One or more **processes** are dedicated to fault injection → Keeps a clean boundary between the normal behavior of a system and its fault profile, centralized approach
- **Common/Finally Blocks:** They are executed before and after state-specific code upon process activation → They can also access activation arguments and local variables, per-instance behaviors are possible
- **Annotation-Based Injector:** CPAL supports **annotations** to express non-functional properties of a program and isolate them from functional properties → With respect to common/finally, they can also affect **state transitions**

Summary Table

Mechanism	Fault category			
	Global state	Activation arguments	Local variables	Control flow
External process(es)	✓			✓
Pre/post conditions	✓	✓	✓	
Annotation-based	✓			✓

Results

- Software fault injection of **data errors** can be effectively performed at the DSL level
- More limited modeling of code changes is possible, too
- All patterns can be fully **automated**

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Ongoing Work

Automatic code generation and instrumentation

- Complete the **implementation** of the fault tolerance and fault injection framework
- Operate only at the **DSL** level, for modularity and applicability to other languages
- Design an appropriate annotation-based **language extension** to this purpose
- Consider further fault tolerance and injection **mechanisms**

Further Reading



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THANK YOU FOR YOUR ATTENTION

